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a b s t r a c t
Using Philippon’s (2015) recently published historical household debt data, this paper uses
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2012) generalized variance decompositions and generalized impulse
responses to understand the relationship between interest rates, the stock market, household debt, and the distribution of income in the U.S. The results indicate that increases in
the stock market and household debt increase income inequality. Moreover, the relationship between the interest rate and income inequality is found to be negative and statistically significant. We interpret our results as suggesting that high income earners derive a
larger portion of their income from interest rate sensitive assets.
Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
On October 17th, 2014, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen spent significant time discussing income inequality in
the United States at a Boston Federal Reserve Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality. She stated:
‘‘. . .. . .The extent of and continuing increase in inequality in the United States greatly concern me. The past several decades have seen the most sustained rise in inequality since the 19th century after more than 40 years of narrowing
inequality following the Great Depression. By some estimates, income and wealth inequality are near their highest levels
in the past hundred years, much higher than the average during that time span and probably higher than for much of
American history before then. It is no secret that the past few decades of widening inequality can be summed up as significant income and wealth gains for those at the very top and stagnant living standards for the majority. I think it is
appropriate to ask whether this trend is compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high value
Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”2

Federal Reserve officials have often discussed income inequality in speeches, however, there is not a consensus regarding
the degree to which income inequality should be a concern for the Federal Reserve. Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1998 stated:
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: berishae@montclair.edu (E. Berisha), eric.olson@mail.wvu.edu (E. Olson).
This research was prepared by the author in his personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the United States Postal Service or the United States government.
2
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141017 a.htm.
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‘‘. . .. . ..We need to ask, for example, whether we should be concerned with the degree of income inequality if all groups
are experiencing relatively rapid gains in their real incomes, though those rates of gain may differ. And, we cannot ignore
what is happening to the level of average income while looking at trends in the distribution. In this regard, our goal as
central bankers should be clear: we must pursue monetary conditions in which stable prices contribute to maximizing
sustainable long-run growth.”3

Historically, the primary channel that the central bank could redistribute wealth was thought to be the inflation rate.
Inflation that was higher than the expected inflation rate redistributed wealth from creditors to debtors. However, given that
part of the Federal Reserve’s mandate is a low unemployment rate, the Federal Reserve has often lowered interest rates in
attempts to stimulate the economy. As such, while lowering interest rates may stimulate the economy, it is not clear that all
income groups experience equal growth in incomes because of the policy stimulus. This paper explores whether there is a
debt and equity channel through which changes in interest rates may affect income inequality through either increased
household debt or by increasing the value of financial assets that are owned primarily by high income families.
Past studies have analyzed separately how these three variables (the interest rate, household debt, stock market) impact
income inequality, but all four variables have not been analyzed simultaneously in a dynamic setting. Kumhof and Ranciere
(2013) provide a theoretical framework linking income inequality and debt-to-income ratios. In their model, the key mechanism is that top earners use a substantial portion of their income to accumulate financial wealth through loans to those at
the low-end of the income distribution.4 Iacoviello (2008), using a DSGE model, shows that income inequality has primarily
been increased by an expansion of credit from rich (saving) to poor (spending) households. Rajan (2010) and Reich (2010) provide qualitative arguments linking income inequality to debt levels. Coibion et al. (2012) examine the direct link between
income inequality and the interest rate and they document four possible channels through which interest rates may affect
inequality. First, households that own firms (i.e. equity holders) may do better during periods of monetary expansion if profits
rise faster than wages.5 Second and related to the first, households that are more integrated to financial markets, and thereby
more integrated to central banks, may benefit more during monetary expansions as the price of credit falls. Third, the savings
redistribution channel in which declines in inflation rates benefit savers. Lastly, they present the earnings heterogeneity channel
in which wage income between low and high-income earners may differ as lower-income households are more likely to be
unemployed if monetary contraction occurs and slows economic growth. They conclude that the financial segmentation channel
and the portfolio channel will increase inequality when an expansionary monetary policy shock occurs. In contrast, the savings
redistribution channel and earnings heterogeneity channels will decrease inequality after an expansionary monetary policy
shock. Furceri et al. (2016) find that, for a panel of 32 advanced and emerging market countries over the period 1990–2013,
expansionary monetary policy reduces income inequality (p. 20). However, they infer that monetary policy can increase
inequality by boosting asset prices or inflation. Auclert (2016) also claims that low rates can increase asset prices, which then
may exacerbate income inequality. It should be noted that declining interest rates may not be the result of any specific central
bank policy. Slowing productivity growth in the U.S. or a global savings glut, as discussed by Bernanke (2010), may be the driving force behind low interest rates, especially since the 1980s.6
Our paper directly examines the response of equities and the response of aggregate household debt due to changes in
interest rates using data beginning in 1919. We use data spanning from 1919 to 2009 which includes key historical periods,
such as the Great Depression era and the 1950s and 1960s where inequality was quite low relative to the present. We show
that low interest rates lead to increases in equity returns, increases in household indebtedness, and increases in income
inequality. The reason we focus on testing for a household debt and equity channel is that debt and equities are significant
components of households’ balance sheets. As such, we provide further details on how these two components evolved differently over time among the households’ balance sheets at different levels of the income distribution. Overall, we believe
that our paper helps clarify the relationship between income inequality and interest rates by providing a more detailed
examination of the debt and equity channels. To test our channels, we estimate impulse responses from both a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) and by using Koop et al. (1996) generalized impulse responses; the results show consistency
across the two different specifications of the VARs. Additionally, we also estimate Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2012) generalized
variance decompositions. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section II discusses the composition of household
wealth, section III discusses our data and methodology, section IV presents our results, and section V concludes.
2. Inequality and the sources of household income
Understanding the evolution of the different income groups and how they earn their income over time allows for a better
understanding behind the purpose of our three different income inequality measures. It also highlights the significance of the
3

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980828.htm.
The reasons for increased household debt may be due to a ‘‘keeping up with the Jones’” story, but, barring surveys of why households are spending, it would
be difficult to tell why they are increasing spending/consumption.
5
Along these lines, Kaplan et al. (2016) shows that expansionary policy lowers the cost of funds for the financial sector, profits increase, and households then
shift into illiquid productive assets (defined as corporate equity, private equity, and portions of housing and durable investment) (p. 42).
6
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103 a.htm.
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Fig. 1. Top income shares.

debt and equity channels through which monetary policy affects the distribution of income. Fig. 1 shows that the share of
total income going to top income groups has increased dramatically, especially for the post-1980s period.
Interestingly, most of the changes in the top decile are due to large changes in the top centile. The ‘‘10% - 1%” income
group captures the income share of the top decile, excluding the top 1%. Note that we do not see large changes in the income
share of this group over time. The ‘‘10%-1%” share increased from 24.6% in 1980 to 26.2% in 2007. On the other hand, the
income share of the top 1% increased from 10.0% to 23.5% over the same period. Within the top 1% group, it is the top
0.1% that has experienced the biggest increase in income. Their income share has almost quadrupled, from 3.4% in 1980
to 12.3% in 2007. Similarly, Saez and Zucman (2016) show, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, that the
top 0.1% of households’ incomes have increased dramatically since the 1970s. Also, Wolff (2012, 2014) explains that virtually
all of the income gains since 1983 have gone to the top 20% of earners. It appears from our analysis, in correspondence with
other authors, that the top 1%, particularly, experienced a large increase in income.7
We believe differences in the way households earn their income has contributed to increases in top income shares. Figs. 2–
5 show the income sources for the top 0.1%, the top 1 %, and bottom 90% of income earners. For the bottom 90% group, most
of their income comes from wages and very little income comes from capital gains, interest or dividends, or business equity.
This has been consistent since 1989. On the other hand, more than 40% of income for the top 1% group and more than 50% of
income for the top 0.1% group is from non-wage sources.8
Approximately, 15% of income for the top 1% group and almost 20% of income for the top 0.1% group comes from interest.
For the bottom 90% group, this source of income is almost zero. Entrepreneurial activities provide 20% of income for the top
1% group and 30% of income for the top 0.1% group. However, for the bottom 90%, only 5% of income comes from entrepreneurial activities. From Fig. 5, we observe that realized capital gains are an important source of income for households at the
top end of the income distribution; whereas, for the bottom 90%, this source of income is very close to zero. On average, realized capital gains compose 20% of income for the top 1% group and close to 40% for the top 0.1% group. A more detailed look
into the breakdown of income in the past would be valuable but data pre-dating 1989 was not readily available for the bottom 90% group from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Furthermore, Fig. 6 decomposes the balance sheet components of wealthy households and households in the middle 60%
of the income distribution. As can be seen, for the top 1% group, 80% of wealth is held in business equities, financial instruments, and liquid assets. On the other hand, these three components represent less than 25% of wealth for the middle 60% of
households. Roughly 2/3rds of the middle 60%’s wealth is in housing. Correspondingly, Doepke et al. (2015) assert that middle class households are generally highly leveraged, with many holding mortgage debts that are far larger than their net
worth.
From Fig. 7, it can be seen that debt service, from the beginning of the 1990s, consistently increased until the end of 2007.
This suggests that, over the last 20 years, households devoted larger shares of their income to paying interest or directly paying off their debt. The figure also shows that the increase in overall debt service was mainly driven by the increases in mortgage debt service. The debt service data are aggregated data and we cannot split them based on income quintiles; however,
we can still say that most of the increase in debt service comes from households outside the top end of the income distribution. This is mainly because, for low to middle-income households, housing is their main source of wealth (as seen in
Fig. 6). Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 8, only households in the top 10% of the income distribution have had their debtto-assets ratio remain constant over the last 24 years. Whereas, for the other households, increases in leverage ranged from

7
Heathcoate et al. (2010), in a micro-level study, also note that dispersion between the top (90th percentile) and middle incomes (50th percentile) has
increased consistently since the 1970s (p. 23).
8
Note the data source for the top 0.1% and top 1% is the World Wealth & Income Database and the income compositions are the share of total income
excluding capital gains. The share of wages to total income would have been even lower for these two groups if capital gains were part of total income. The
shares for the bottom 90% come from our own calculations using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Fig. 2. Income shares from wages.

Fig. 3. Income shares from interest.

Fig. 4. Income shares from entreprenuership.

5% to nearly a 10% increase depending on the specific income groups. As such, increases in leverage mean increases in debt
service.
The differences in how households earn their income is the mechanism through which we think changes in the interest
rate, asset prices, and household debt are affecting the top earning households differently than lower income households.

E. Berisha et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 80 (2018) 1–14
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Fig. 5. Income shares from capital gains.

Fig. 6. Composition of household wealth.

Fig. 7. Household debt as a ratio of income.

Specifically, the inverse link between the interest rate and equities, followed by increases in income inequality, we believe, is
driven by the fact that the top income groups earn significantly more of their income and hold more of their wealth in equities. Owyang and Shell (2016) highlight that wealthy households own most of the equity in the United States and, thus,
increases in the stock market disproportionately benefit high income families. Note in Fig. 9 that the top 10% of households
have seen over a tripling in the real value of their financial assets; whereas, the bottom 90% of households have seen hardly
any increase in the value of their assets. This most likely masks the true increase in financial assets of the top 1% and top 0.1%

6
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Fig. 8. Leverage ratio by household income percentile.

Fig. 9. Median value of financial assets.

of the income distribution as they are averaged out with lower earning families within the top 10% of earners. On the other
hand, observing the fact that income from non-wage activities has been relatively stagnant for most of the households outside the upper end of the income distribution, we believe that low rates have made it easier for these households to accumulate debt relative to their income (likely mortgage debt). This has been accompanied with increases in debt service.
Intuitively, increases in debt service have benefited debt providers (wealthy households), resulting in higher income disparity between debt holders and debt providers.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Annual S&P 500 and interest rate data were collected from the FRED database. Our annual measure of household debt
data was taken from Philippon (2015). Philippon (2015) defined debt as the level of household debt normalized by output.9
The annual data used for our measures of inequality were obtained from the World Wealth & Income Database due to its relatively long time-series. Piketty and Saez (2001) give a detailed description on how the top income shares are estimated. The
top income shares are based on tax returns data published by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The income definition they use
is a gross income definition including all the income items reported on tax returns (prior to deductions): salaries and wages,
small business and farm income, partnership and fiduciary income, dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and other small items
reported as other income. Then, the income shares are estimated by dividing the income amounts accruing to each top fractile
by total personal income computed from the National Accounts. In this paper, we use the calculated top income shares including realized capital gains.10
9

We used both measures of household debt available in Philippon (2015). Our results were nearly identical using either measure.
An argument that has been raised since the publication of Piketty’s book is that his data overestimates true inequality. Alvaredo (2011) shows that, in fact,
most current survey based studies underestimate the true level of wealth held by top income earners.
10

E. Berisha et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 80 (2018) 1–14

7

Our first measure of inequality is probably the most familiar, the Gini coefficient, which summarizes the distribution of
income into a single numerical index.11 It ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 indicates that a tiny
group owns all resources. One criticism regarding the Gini coefficient is that it does not let us clearly understand how much
income is received by different groups within the income distribution. Particularly, we may miss much of the change occurring
at the top of the income distribution. Therefore, we also look at the evolution of the shares of top centiles relative to the rest of
income earners by constructing a Theil index using data on income shares for the top 1% and bottom 99% of income earners
from the World Wealth & Income Database. This lets us better understand the disproportionate share of growth taken by
the top end of the distribution as noted in Piketty (2014) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007). Additionally, we use the inverted
Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, which measures income inequality between the top 1% and 0.1% of income earners (Piketty and Saez,
2001; Atkinson et al., 2011).
The Theil index provides a measure of the discrepancies between the distribution of income and the distribution of population between groups of individuals. If all population groups have an income share equal to their population share, the
overall Theil index is zero. For instance, the top 1 percent of earners would get 1 percent of income and the bottom 99 percent of earners would get 99 percent of the income. As such, the index for the top 1% was constructed as follows:

T ¼ Itop1  jItop1  Ntop1 j þ Ib99  jIb99  Nb99 j

ð1Þ

where the I’s indicate the income share of the various income percentiles and the N’s indicate the size of the respective percentiles (here they would simply be 0.01 and 0.99). All data was collected for the 1919–2009 time period.
Looking at Fig. 10, we can see that relative to the other two inequality measures, the Gini coefficient has a lower variance
and the slope of the series is much lower for the post 1980s period.
As mentioned above, this can lead the Gini coefficient to underestimate the true level of income inequality. By using three
distinct measures of income inequality, we aim to show which income groups were most affected by changes in the financial
variables we consider.
The length of our series is important as it allows us to observe inequality through different historical periods. Changes in
the tax code and treatment of different types of income are important to note. For example, the 1980s saw significant
changes in tax policy and in general economic policy during the Reagan administration. Particularly, 1986 is often singled
out as a groundbreaking year in the tax literature due to the significant changes brought about by the Tax Reform Act. Also,
perhaps the ‘‘Reagan Revolution”, lower unionization, and financial deregulation had large impacts on inequality. The ‘‘Volcker disinflation” also occurred in the early 1980s which may have affected the income distribution. Levy and Temin (2007)
provide further details on many institutional changes in the U.S. for the interested reader. In light of these concerns, to
ensure our model is not misspecified, we test for structural breaks.
3.2. Methodology
We consider the following 4-variable VAR (p),

Zt ¼

p
X

Ui Z tp þ et

ð2Þ

i¼1

such that Z 0t = [DInterestt, DS&Pt, DDebtt , DInequalityt ] where DInterestt, DS&Pt, DDebtt ,DInequalityt are changes in the AAA
Moody’s Corporate bond rate, S&P 500, household debt as a percentage of RGDP, and the three inequality measures we consider.12 e ð0; RÞ is a vector of independent and identically distributed error terms. A lag length for (2) was selected using the
Akaike Information Criteria and the Bayesian/Schwarz Information Criteria which both suggested p = 1. We chose to first estimate generalized impulse response functions and generalized variance decompositions that are invariant to the ordering of the
variables. We also estimate a SVAR using a Choleski decomposition for robustness. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) build upon Koop
et al. (1996) and develop forecast error decompositions that are invariant to the variable ordering. As such, we implement both
Koop et al. (1996) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) in order to generate generalized impulse response functions and generalized
variance decompositions.
As noted in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), the variance decompositions allow one to assess the fraction of the H-step-ahead
error variance in forecasting zi that is due to shocks to zj, 8j–i, for each i. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) use the structure of Koop
et al. (1996) to produce variance decompositions that are invariant to the ordering of the variables because of the use of the
historically observed distribution of the errors. Given the uncertainty regarding the correct ordering of our variables, we follow Koop et al. (1996) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and generate generalized impulse response functions and generalized
variance decompositions. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) define the own variance shares as the fraction of the HAstep-ahead
error variances in forecasting zi that are due to shocks to zi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and cross variance shares as the fraction of
the HAstep-ahead error variances in forecasting zi that are due to shocks to zij for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N such that i – j. The
Koop et al. (1996) H-step-ahead forecast error variance decompositions are
11

The Gini coefficient does not include capital gains.
For robustness we also used interest data on U.S. Treasuries that span a similar time period; however, our results were quantitatively and qualitatively
similar. These findings are discussed further in the results section.
12
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Fig. 10. Income inequality measures.

PH1  0 P 2
ej
r1
h¼0 ei Ah
jj
hijg ðHÞ ¼ P 
X 0 
H1
0
Ah e i
h¼0 ei Ah

ð3Þ

P
where
is the variance matrix for the error vector e, rjj is the standard deviation of the error term for the jth equation, and
ei is the selection vector, with 1 as the ith element and zeros otherwise. Because the sum of the elements in each row of the
variance decomposition table need not equal 1, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) normalize each entry in the variance decomposition matrix by:

h g ðHÞ
~h g ðHÞ ¼ P ij
ij
N
g
j¼1 hij ðHÞ
such that by construction

ð4Þ
PN ~ g
j¼1 hij ðHÞ ¼ 1. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) then use the volatility contributions from the above

generalized variance decomposition to construct the total spillover index as:

PN
~g
i; j ¼ 1 hij ðHÞ
i–j
S g ðHÞ ¼
 100
N

ð5Þ

Thus, the total spillover index measures the contribution of volatility shocks across the four variables in our VAR to the
total forecast error variance. The directional volatility spillovers Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) subsequently layout provide a
decomposition of the total spillovers to those coming from (or to) a particular variable. The volatility spillover received
by variable i from all other variables j is

Sig ðHÞ ¼

P
j¼1
j–i

N~g
hij ðHÞ

ð6Þ

N  100
Similarly, the directional volatility spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j is

Sig ðHÞ ¼

P
j¼1
j–i

N~g
hji ðHÞ

ð7Þ

N  100
The net spillover from variable i to all other variables j is

Sig ðHÞ ¼ Sig ðHÞ  Sig ðHÞ

ð8Þ

The net pairwise volatility spillovers, are defined as

Sijg ðHÞ ¼

~h g ðHÞ  ~h g ðHÞ
ji
ij
N

 100

ð9Þ

4. Results
Before estimating (2), we conduct unit root tests for all variables included in the VAR. As noted above, changes in the tax
code or other political changes may have caused a structural break in the inequality time-series we use. To address the con-
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cern of a structural break in the inequality series’, we utilized the two-break minimum LM unit root test that endogenously
determines two structural breaks (T B ) in the level and trend developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003). All variables were found
to contain unit roots and did not have structural breaks and were thus differenced.13

4.1. Impulse response functions
For ease of exposition, we standardized and cumulated the generalized impulse responses. Figs. 11–13 display the
impulse responses from estimating (2) using the three different measures of income inequality. Fig. 11 displays the
responses using the Gini coefficient as the income inequality measure, Fig. 12 displays the results using the Theil index,
and Fig. 13 displays the results using the inverted Pareto coefficient. The figures should be read such that the column variable
shocks the row variable.
Note, that while the point estimates are all negative, only for income inequality represented by the Top 1% Thiel index do
changes in the interest rate have a statistically significant effect. The result suggests that a positive one standard deviation
shock to the interest rate has a statistically significant, negative impact on income inequality which is approximately 0.25
standard deviations after five years. This implies that expansionary monetary policy increases income disparity between
the top 1% and the bottom 99% income groups. One possible reason we may not see similar effects with the Gini coefficient
and the inverted Pareto coefficient is that these two measures compare income groups that are more similar than different:
the Gini primarily captures lower and middle income changes while the inverted Pareto coefficient captures changes at the
very top of the income distribution. Another possible reason we see a significant response in the Top 1% Theil index from
changes in the interest rate is that, as we presented in Section 2, a higher portion of income for households within the
top 1% of earners is from interest rate sensitive assets. Put another way, high income earners have a higher interest rate elasticity of income than those at the bottom of the income distribution. If we look back to Fig. 5, income shares from realized
capital gains for the period 1990–2009 doubled for households in the top 1% of the income distribution; whereas, for households in the bottom 90%, this source of income is almost zero. Similarly, wealthy households receive roughly 30% of their
income from entrepreneurship (see Fig. 4). Thus, low rates may have helped high income earners to further expand their
entrepreneurial activities and invest in financial markets, which has led to upsurges in their income shares.
Furthermore, comparing Figs. 3–5, it clearly suggests that sources of income that benefit from low interest rates (capital
gains and entrepreneurship) dominate sources of income that are affected negatively by low rates (income from interest
rates). We believe this is the reason why we capture an inverse relationship between interest rates and income inequality.
Another plausible explanation, as presented by Doepke et al. (2015), is that low interest rates reflect low and stable rates of
inflation, which mainly helps savers (households at the top of the income distribution) and harms debt holders (households
at the middle and bottom of the income distribution). When capital gains are excluded from the top 1% income shares, the
inverse relationship between the interest rate and the Top 1% Thiel index remained, but it was not statistically significant.14
Note in the second column of Figs. 11–13 that positive shocks to the stock market show statistically significant effects
across the three measures of income inequality. Per one standard deviation increase in stock market returns, the Gini coefficient increases contemporaneously by 0.4 standard deviations. The Top 1% Theil index and the inverted Pareto coefficient
increase by approximately 0.5 standard deviations. The magnitude of the relationship remains statistically significant, but
drops by half when realized capital gains are excluded from the income inequality measures.
From the first column, we can see that positive shocks to the interest rate have an adverse effect on the stock market and
household debt. Bordo and Landon-Lane (2013) document that ‘‘loose” monetary policy impacts asset prices positively and
significance remains across different sub-periods. Interestingly, positive shocks in household debt as well as income inequality (across all three measures) have a statistically significant effect on stock returns by 0.25 and 1.0 standard deviations,
respectively. This suggests that equity markets benefit from increased household debt as well as increased income inequality. These findings remain intact even after capital gains are excluded from the income inequality measures.
Note in the third column of Figs. 11–13 that a one standard deviation increase in household debt leads to statistically significant increases in income inequality across the measures that capture top income shares. After five years, income inequality is 0.5 standard deviations higher using the Top 1% Theil index and 0.4 standard deviations higher using the IPAR
coefficient. The positive response of income inequality from increases in debt and equities is consistent with the idea that
top earners use a substantial portion of their income to accumulate financial wealth through loans to those at the low
end of the income distribution as in Kumhof and Ranciere (2013). The findings are consistent when capital gains are
excluded from the measures. Interestingly, changes in household debt show no statistically significant effect on the variation
of the Gini coefficient. One possible explanation is that the Gini coefficient mainly captures income inequality in the middle
of the income distribution. As we saw in Section 2, these households hold roughly similar levels of debt relative to their
income. Thus, income disparity among the households outside the top end of the income distribution is not responding
to the changes in household debt.
One criticism of generalized impulse responses is that, if the responses are highly correlated, the shocks are almost
impossible to interpret reasonably. As such, as a robustness test, we estimated (2) using a Choleski decomposition of the
13
14

Results may be obtained upon request of the authors.
The findings based on income inequality measures that exclude capital gains are available upon request.
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Fig. 11. Generalized impulse responses using gini coefficient as income inequality measure.

Fig. 12. Generalized impulse responses using 1% theil index as income inequality measure.

covariance matrix. Figs. 14–16 display the results from estimating (2) using a Choleski decomposition, where the AAA Moody’s Corporate bond rate is used as the interest rate variable.
In addition, we also estimated (2) using changes in the 10-year Treasury bond rates as an alternative to the AAA Corporate
bond rate since most households possess mortgage debt and mortgage rates are tightly tied to the 10-year Treasury bond
rates (and most of the investments are long term). The results were nearly identical and may be obtained upon request
of the authors.
The inverse relationship between interest rates and income inequality identified from the empirical results is contrary to
the results obtained by Coibion et al. (2012). We believe that differences in the data sources and the length of the time-series
used might lead to the different results found in this paper. The income inequality measures calculated by Coibion et al. are
based on the income data reported in the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the series are available only from 1980. We use
the income data from the World Wealth & Income Database, which allows us to perform the analysis starting from 1919.
Also, it should be noted that the income data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey does not include household incomes
that are at the upper end of the income distribution, such as the top 1% of income earners. The upper income in Coibion
et al.’s analysis is defined by household income at the 90th percentile.15 Two of our income inequality measures capture

15

10).

Specifically, Coibion et al. (2012) use the Gini coefficient and the ratio of earnings of the 90th percentile of earners to the 10th percentile of earners (p. 8–

E. Berisha et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 80 (2018) 1–14

11

Fig. 13. Generalized impulse responses of income inequality using inverted pareto coefficient as income inequality measure.

Fig. 14. Choleski decomposition: impulse responses using gini coefficient as income inequality measure.

income shares at the upper end of the income distribution: the Top 1% Thiel index and the inverted Pareto coefficient. As we saw
from Section 2, within the top 10%, it is the top 1% and top 0.1% of earners that have benefited the most during the last 30 years.
As seen in Fig. 1, the income shares of the households in the top 9% of the income distribution increased roughly 2% between
1980 and 2007. Over the same period, the income share of the top 1% more than doubled and the income share of the top 0.1%
almost quadrupled. Thus, we believe that the income sources of a household at the 90th percentile of the income distribution
are very different from the income sources of a household in the top 1% (99th percentile) or the top 0.1% (99.9th percentile) of
earners. Lastly, there are differences in the measures of income used in constructing the income inequality measures that might
contribute to differences in the results between this paper and Coibion et al.’s. Total income from Coibion et al. includes transfers for each household and does not include realized capital gains. The income measures from the World Wealth & Income
Database include all the income items reported on tax returns (prior to deductions) and do not include transfers.
4.2. Generalized variance decompositions
Table 1 Panel A displays the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) generalized variance decompositions using the Gini coefficient as
the measure of inequality.16
16
Since the results are similar across the two interest rate measures, we only report the findings when the AAA Moody’s Corporate bond rate is used as the
monetary policy variable.
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Fig. 15. Choleski decomposition: impulse responses using 1% theil index as income inequality measure.

Fig. 16. Choleski decomposition: impulse responses of income inequality using inverted pareto coefficient as income inequality measure.

As can be seen in the last column of Table 1 Panel A, a substantial portion of the variation in the stock market, household
leverage, and the Gini coefficient are attributed to the other variables in the VAR. 4.4% of the variation in the stock market
returns is accounted for by the interest rate, 6.6% by household leverage, and 27.8% by the Gini coefficient. As can be seen in
row 3 of Table 1 Panel A, 13.5% of the variation in household debt is attributed to the interest rate, 6.5% to the stock market,
and 3.9% to the Gini coefficient. In row 4, note that 17.3% of the variation in the Gini coefficient is explained by the stock
market, 2.6% is explained by household leverage, and 0.3% is explained by the interest rate. In sum, 20% of the variation
in the Gini coefficient is explained by the financial variables in the VAR. The Gini coefficient accounts for a total of 33% of
the variation in the other variables in Table 1 Panel A. As discussed before, the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes
in the lower to middle income groups. If these groups have seen relatively little movement in income over broad sections of
time, then this measure may not fully capture changes at the top of the income distribution. Still, given the limitations of the
Gini coefficient, we see some evidence that equity markets matter in regards to inequality.
Table 1 Panel B displays the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) generalized variance decompositions using the Top 1% Theil index
as the measure of inequality.
As can be seen in the last column of Table 1 Panel B, much of the variation in the stock market, household leverage, and
Top 1% Theil index is attributed to the other variables in the VAR. 4.6% of the variation in stock market returns is accounted
for by the interest rate, 4.9% by household leverage, and surprisingly, 28.4% by the Top 1% Theil index measure. As can be
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Table 1
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) generalized variance decompositions.

Panel A (Gini)
Interest Rate
S&P 500 Returns
Household Debt
Gini
Contribution to Others

Panel B (Top 1% Thiel Index)
Interest Rate
S&P 500 Returns
Household Debt
1% Theil Index
Contribution to Others

Panel C (IPAR)
Interest Rate
S&P 500 Returns
Household Debt
Inverted Pareto Coeff.
Contribution to Others

Interest Rate

S&P 500 Returns

Household Debt

Gini

From Others

88.5
4.4
13.5
0.3
18.0

6.8
61.2
6.5
17.3
31.0

3.6
6.6
76.2
2.6
13.0

1.1
27.8
3.9
79.8
33.0

11.0
39.0
24.0
20.0

Interest Rate

S&P 500 Returns

Household Debt

1% Theil Index

From Others

86.2
4.6
11.7
2.7
19.0

6.5
62.1
5.3
18.2
30.0

3.2
4.9
74.0
8.8
17.0

4.0
28.4
9.0
70.3
41.0

14.0
38.0
26.0
30.0

Interest Rate

S&P 500 Returns

Household Debt

Inverted Pareto Coeff.

From Others

86.0
5.5
12.4
3.3
21.0

7.2
63.3
5.9
16.7
30.0

3.4
5.9
75.8
7.0
16.0

3.4
25.3
5.9
73.0
35.0

14.0
37.0
24.0
27.0

seen in row 3 of Table 1 Panel B, 11.7% of the variation in household debt is attributed to the interest rate, 5.3% to the stock
market, and 9% to the Top 1% Theil index. In row 4 of Table 1 Panel B, note that 18.2% of the variation in the Top 1% Theil
index is explained by the stock market, 8.8% is explained by household leverage, and 2.7% is explained by the interest rate.
In sum, 30% of the variation in the Top 1% Theil index is explained by the financial variables in the VAR.
Our inequality measure accounts for a total of 41% of the variation in the other variables in Table 1 Panel B. Recall that the
Top 1% Theil index is capturing the discrepancy between the top 1% and bottom 99% of earners. Note that the income
inequality measure accounts for 28.4% of the variation in stock market returns. This provides support for the idea that
the top 1% participate more in the stock market meaning, that as more income is distributed to the top 1%, more income
flows into the stock market. Additionally, note that household debt and the stock market explain a fairly large amount of
variation in the Top 1% Theil index, providing evidence for an equity and debt channel in regards to inequality. In addition,
the interest rate explains a large part of household debt, further supporting the debt channel of monetary policy impacting
income inequality.
Table 1 Panel C displays the generalized variance decompositions of income inequality using the inverted Pareto coefficient as the measure of inequality.
As seen in the last column of Table 1 Panel C, other variables explain 37% of variation in the stock market, with 5.5% attributed to the interest rate, 5.9% attributed to household leverage, and 25.3% attributed to the inverted Pareto coefficient. In row
3 of Table 1 Panel C, we see that 12.4% of the variation in household leverage is attributed to the interest rate, 5.9% is attributed to the stock market, and 5.9% is attributed to the inverted Pareto coefficient. In total, 24% of the variation in household
leverage is explained by other variables. In row 4, we see that 3.3% of the variation in the inverted Pareto coefficient is
explained by the interest rate, 16.7% is explained by the stock market, and 7% is explained by household leverage. Overall,
27% of the variation in the inverted Pareto coefficient is explained by the financial variables. Correspondingly, the inverted
Pareto coefficient explains roughly 35% of the variance in the financial variables.
5. Conclusion
We have provided a long-run analysis describing the relationship between three key financial variables (interest rates,
household debt, and equity returns (S&P 500)) and three measures of income inequality. We believe the longer time period
used in this paper, from 1919 to 2009, gives us an advantage relative to other studies because the longer span of data allows
us to observe the long-run response of inequality. We provide evidence for the different channels affecting inequality by analyzing how households earn their income. Using Philippon’s (2015) household debt data, we show that the stock market and
household debt have significant effects on income dispersion in the United States. Interest rates have a direct effect only
when we consider the Top 1% Thiel index. In summary, our results suggest that household debt and equities are inversely
related to interest rates and associated with higher levels of income inequality. This provides supporting evidence for
Kumhof and Ranciere’s (2013) debt-to-income inequality hypothesis and Stiglitz’s (2015) equity-to-income inequality
hypothesis. Also, we document a direct link between increases in income inequality, defined as the income disparity
between the top 1% and bottom 99% income groups, and low interest rates. The significance dropped when capital gains
were excluded from the income shares. As such, we believe that our results suggest that low interest rates can exacerbate
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income inequality primarily because high income households derive a larger portion of their income from interest rate sensitive sources rather than wages. There may be additional explanations and our analysis is an attempt to help shed light on a
few potential causes of inequality.
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